Respecting the autonomy of disabled people is an important ethical issue for providers of long-term care. In this influential book, George Agich abandons comfortable abstractions to reveal the concrete threats to personal autonomy in this setting, where ethical conflict, dilemma, and tragedy are inescapable. He argues that liberal accounts of autonomy and individual rights are insufficient, and offers an account of autonomy that matches the realities of long-term care. The book therefore offers a framework for caregivers to develop an ethic of long-term care within the complex environment in which many dependent and aged people find themselves.
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Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge The first edition of this book was dedicated to my mother-in-law and fatherin-law. My father-in-law had been diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease and required institutional care, so their view of the problems discussed therein was far more significantly 'inside' than my own. Several years ago, my own mother also developed memory loss and confusion that eventually necessitated her moving into an assisted-living center, where she resided until her death. These events are deeply personal reminders that the challenges of respecting the autonomy of disabled elders are often bound up with family relationships, commitments, and emotional meanings that must be accommodated in ethical analysis. Attention to autonomy in long-term care is thus important less for philosophical reasons than for the existential impact that disabilities create for persons who deserve our love and respect. I hope that this work challenges and helps caregivers to reexamine their commitments and practices to enhance the dimming autonomy of old people and the threatened autonomy of disabled individuals.
The primary examples used in this revision, as in the original work, are frail and disabled elders. to a much wider range of chronic conditions, not all of them debilitating or end-of-life. I have dealt with some of these areas in papers written after the first edition was published: for example, the meaning of actual autonomy and longterm care in the context of chronic disease (Agich 1995a (Agich , 1995b , schizophrenia (Agich 1997), consent in research on Alzheimer's disease (Agich 1996) , and the meaning of autonomy in Alzheimer's disease and dementia (Agich 1994 (Agich , 1999 . Others have adapted the concept of actual autonomy in empirical studies of rehabilitation (Proot et al. 1998 (Proot et al. , 2000a (Proot et al. , 2000b (Proot et al. , 2000c . To avoid compromising the line of argument, however, I chose not to introduce these kinds of examples in any significant way, for fear of losing focus. This omission is justified primarily because the application of the concept of actual autonomy in contexts like rehabilitation tends to confirm, rather than challenge or compromise, the main lines of my analysis of autonomy in old age. My work on the problem of autonomy and long-term care began in 1987 when I first addressed some of the difficulties associated with its meaning and function. I saw the need for an alternative to the mainstream, liberal view of autonomy as applied to the complex clinical problems and settings of old age. A viable alternative should preserve the core commitments of liberal theory, so I avoided seeking refuge from the problems of respecting autonomy in communitarian or care ethics, even though the approaches are compatible with my own. Instead, I wanted to develop a more nuanced concept of autonomy that was more appropriate to the concrete reality of the long-term care context.
I have had little interest in cataloging the range of ethical problems in nursing homes and to some extent I have avoided directly confronting a number of important societal problems involving the aging of the population, such as the allocation of resources or intergenerational issues of justice. This work, instead, is an extended essay on the practical meaning and function of autonomy under the conditions of disability that create the need for chronic care. Its guiding idea is that autonomy is a central ethical concept in this context, but only if it can be refurbished. The argument is developed along two lines: first, an extended appraisal of the liberal view of autonomy and its applicability in long-term care and, second, a phenomenological exposition of the meaning of actual autonomy in the everyday world and in long-term care. The goal of the phenomenological account of actual autonomy is to set out a framework within which practical work on autonomy and long-term care can proceed. The analysis and discussion are at certain points rather coarse grained, because the objective of this book is programmatic, namely, to set out a framework for practical thinking about autonomy in the context of long-term care. This book does not purport to address fully the range of ethical issues associated with geriatrics and gerontology. The ethical theory in the book is not fully developed or justified to any serious extent and there is little in the way of prescriptions or normative rules to guide conduct. Instead, I have aimed to
